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Abstract
In the perspective of a social-ecological transformation, this article sets
the discussion on the future of central banking back in the context of ecolog-
ical limits to growth. It first surveys the literature on proposals to introduce
sustainability in central banking. It then draws from the conceptualization
of money as a social relation to discuss central banks’ mandates, indepen-
dence, governance and instruments. This article therefore adopts a norma-
tive stance. Central banks should be politically accountable with a renewed
governance and committees composition. In line with the endogenous na-
ture of money, their mandate needs not to include price stability and should
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focus on fostering full employment, social cohesion and relevant economic
development within the ecological limits of the planet. Three policy instru-
ments are then discussed to shift the nature of central banks’ operations
from responsive to prescriptive: differentiated target interest rates, credit
control and qualitative tightening in assets purchasing programs.
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1 Introduction
A growing topic is the integration of environmental issues into central banking.
The ecological crisis includes amongst other biodiversity loss and overexploitation
of natural resources in the form of materials. The terms “sustainability” or “envi-
ronmental issues” thereafter will refer to the multiple dimensions of the ecological
crisis and not only to climate change.
A few figures are helpful to contextualize the reflections developed in this arti-
cle. The CO2 concentration in the atmosphere is approaching 417 ppm.1 This is
already above the median CO2 concentration compatible with 1.5 degrees path-
ways by 2100 (Masson-Delmotte et al., 2018). As Masson-Delmotte et al. (2018,
p. v) put it, "limiting warming to 1.5ºC is possible within the laws of chemistry
and physics but would require unprecedented transitions in all aspects of society".
Prospects are no better for biodiversity: The planet is now experiencing a sixth
mass extinction of living species at a rate 1000 times higher than the natural ex-
tinction rate (OECD, 2019a). Furthermore, the material basis of our societies
is continuously widening. This leads to additional natural resources exhaustion,
greenhouse gases emissions and biodiversity loss. Material extraction has more
than tripled since 1970, global primary material use is expected to double by 2060
together with growing in-use material stocks and material efficiency has declined
globally since 2000 (Haberl et al., 2020; OECD, 2019b; Schandl et al., 2018).
Therefore, in the current state of knowledge and at the macroeconomic scale,
there is no data to support a scientific discourse on green growth and green cap-
italism (Hickel and Kallis, 2020) — broadly defined as the possibility of pursuing
growth and capital accumulation without unsustainably impacting the environ-
ment. This necessitates absolute decoupling: the concomitant rise of economic pro-
duction and decrease of environmental inputs and outputs. Absolute decoupling
of GDP with GHG emissions is unseen in the data (Schröder and Storm, 2020)
but reaching net-zero emissions is technically feasible although highly challenging
for heavy industries. Moreover, reconciling this objective with GDP growth re-
quires assuming rates of energy efficiency improvement historically unprecedented
and constantly above GDP and population growth rates (Bouckaert et al., 2021;
Energy Transitions Commission, 2018). When speculative assumptions on techno-
logical improvements are taken away, degrowth scenarios appear as the safest way
1https://www.bloomberg.com/graphics/carbon-clock/, accessed June 11, 2021.
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to limit climate change by 1.5 degrees, even if their political feasibility remains dif-
ficult (Keyßer and Lenzen, 2021). Absolute decoupling between GDP, energy and
materials is unseen in the data (Haberl et al., 2020) and it is far from certain that
it would even be possible due to the physical constraints imposed by the second
law of thermodynamics (Ayres, 1999; Glucina and Mayumi, 2010).
The underlying premise is, therefore, that twenty-first century-fit central bank-
ing needs to consider the ecological constraints bounding production processes.
This article is therefore written in a post-growth perspective. The general prob-
lem is the one of a social-ecological transformation: How can we organize society
and design its key institutions in a way that is compatible with the ecological lim-
its of the planet, e.g. which does not make economic growth a necessary condition
for political stability, social cohesion and collective and individual well-being?
As a key social relation, money is to a great extent at the core of socio-economic
dynamics. Indeed, our economies are monetary economies of production: most of
production and exchange occur through money (Rochon and Seccareccia, 2013).
The economic circuit cannot start without money being created in the first place.
The institutions governing money have therefore a crucial role to play in the social-
ecological transformation to come. By money as a social relation I mean the
trust-based general equivalent expressing economic value, linking decentralized
producers and consumers, allowing them to take part in the market and enabling
different kinds of activities — market and non-market — to cohabit on a given
territory and in a given community. From its general acceptance as the legitimate
unit of account stem the usual attributes as mean of payment (in particular, of
debt settlement), mean of exchange, and store of value (Aglietta et al., 2018;
Théret, 1999). In recent history, new capital accumulation regimes (Labrousse and
Michel, 2017) of capitalism were often accompanied by new monetary regimes. A
monetary regime is the combination of monetary policy, financial and capital flows
regulations and lender of last resort mechanisms (Guttmann, 2002). The form of
money, the modalities of monetary creation, the dynamics of its circulation and
the foundations of its value have evolved through time and deeply impacted the
way the economy works. The institutionalization of money both triggers and is the
product of social evolutions (Guttmann, 2002; Ould Ahmed and Ponsot, 2015).
What is really at stake here is therefore the emergence of a new monetary regime as
an indispensable feature of a new accumulation (or, in a post-growth perspective,
non-accumulation or disaccumulation) regime based on new social compromises
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geared toward sustainability.
The discussion on greening monetary policy and central banking has mainly
consisted in adjustments, some of them quite deep, to integrate environmental con-
siderations into a pre-existing non-ecological system. 21st century central banking,
although fashioned in the context of capitalism and legitimized as practices stim-
ulating economic growth, need therefore to be at the same time compatible with
a post-growth world. Nonetheless, such a change does not require to reinvent the
wheel. Monetary history is full of tools that have proven efficient and useful in
different times and places and that appear relevant for the era to come. The re-
search question of this article is prospective and normative: it is to sketch some
elements2 of a monetary regime fitted for a social-ecological transformation.
The article is structured as followed: I briefly survey the literature on current
proposals to reform central banking in section 2. Section 3 is devoted to discussing
money as a social relation, its non-neutrality and the consequences for central
banking. Section 4 draws some lessons and perspectives for governance, political
accountability and mandates. Section 5 is devoted to the instruments of monetary
policy. To conclude, I discuss some theoretical and institutional consequences of a
new monetary regime built upon these proposals.
2 Proposals for reforming central banking and
monetary policy towards sustainability
The autonomy of banks in money creation prevents sustainable sectors to be suffi-
ciently financed (Campiglio, 2016). This is an important point to underline since
credit control policies have been criticized on the ground that they prevent op-
timal equilibrium from emerging (Bezemer et al., 2018). A wealth of proposals
have been developed in the literature to gear financial flows towards sustainable
activities.
2I leave aside exchange rates management and shadow banking. Financial regulation is
discussed in chapters by Svartzman and Dafermos.
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2.1 Integrating sustainability into risk management and
redirecting monetary flows
The proposals enter two main categories: (i) risk management through integrating
sustainability concerns into risk assessment and macroprudential measures and (ii)
redirection of monetary flows through reforming monetary policy instruments. To
green macroprudential regulation, authors have in particular suggested to intro-
duce differentiated reserves, liquidity and capital requirements. Reserves differenti-
ation consists in requiring less reserves for banks’ lending to sustainable activities.
For instance, banks would collect sustainability certificates delivered by an official
third-party body from firms to which they lend and use these certificates as parts
of their reserves. Capital differentiation could be achieved through implementing
brown penalizing or green supporting factors to acts on the risk associated with
assets depending on their degree of sustainability. Less sustainable assets would
count as riskier: Lending to activities associated with these assets would penalize
banks in terms of fulfilling prudential ratios. Similarly, in the case of liquidity
differentiation, less sustainable assets would count as less liquid. Of course, the
effectiveness of these measures depends on the extent to which microprudential
policies really represent a constraint on banks for lending.
To green monetary policy instruments, proposals include (i) green central bank-
ing financing, (ii) lending quotas and incentives, (iii) integrating environmental,
social and governance (ESG) factors into assets eligibility criteria and (iv) green
quantitative easing. Green central bank financing consists either in central banks
directly financing sustainable activities or to lend to public development banks
that would finance sustainable activities. Lending quotas imposes to banks to
lend defined proportions of their total volume of loans to specific sectors. To in-
centivize lending to sustainable activities, proposals include implementing green
targeted long-term refinancing operations (GTLTRO): lower interest rates and
longer maturities would be conditional on the banks’ volume of lending to sectors
complying to environmental standards as well as to the compliance of the pledged
collaterals. Enhancing asset eligibility criteria with ESG factors means essentially
adopting a qualitative tightening policy, which I discuss later. This could lead
to green quantitative easing, which narrows down the assets universe eligible for
purchase by central banks in order to avoid improving the financing conditions
of unsustainable activities and to improve those of sustainable activities (Aglietta
et al., 2015; Bolton et al., 2020; Campiglio, 2016; Campiglio et al., 2018; Dafermos
4
et al., 2020; Matikainen et al., 2017; Rozenberg et al., 2013; van ‘t Klooster and
van Tilburg, 2020; Weber and Calza, 2021).
A number of central banks have already implemented this type of policies In
terms of micro- and macroprudential policies, central banks of Brazil, Netherlands,
Switzerland and China have integrated some sustainability or ESG criteria. Differ-
entiated reserves are at work at the central bank of Lebanon. In terms of monetary
policy, credit quotas and guidance are used by central banks of China, India and
Bangladesh. Differentiated interest rates in the form of preferential refinancing or
subsidized reserves are used by central banks of Japan and Bangladesh (Campiglio
et al., 2018). Green bonds are accepted by the central bank of China as collat-
eral for its mid-term lending facility and the European Central Bank has invested
into green bonds through its Corporate and Public Sectors Purchasing Programs
(CSPPs and PSPPs) (Barmes and Livingstone, 2021; De Santis et al., 2018). In
a sample of fifty-six countries, D’Orazio and Popoyan (2019) find that 10 coun-
tries have implemented mandatory regulations, 13 have implemented voluntary
regulations and 25 are discussing new regulations. Developing and middle-income
countries are leading the way.
2.2 These proposals remain embedded in a market-led un-
derstanding of the social-ecological transformation
These proposals aim at rearranging existing central banking operating framework
through greening the balance sheets of central banks, banks and financial insti-
tutions. We can see here the underlying persistent influence of the original belief
that ensuring price stability ensures financial stability (Schwartz, 1995). Recent
history has opposed a striking refutation of this hypothesis and has made finan-
cial stability an objective of its own for central banks acting as regulators. Now
the reasoning seems to be that through greening balance sheets of the financial
system, climate stability will be achieved and, therefore, feedback climatic effects
will be spared and thus price and financial stability preserved. Price and financial
stability are the channels through which sustainability is brought in and are used
to legitimize both its introduction in central banking and renewed interpretations
of central banks mandates, especially in high income countries.
These proposals therefore do not challenge the market-led logic behind contem-
porary central banking. The approach in terms of risk management rather than
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in terms of environmental objectives stems from this market-logic: if environmen-
tal risks are correctly addressed in asset pricing, balance sheets and operating
frameworks, markets will do. This logic was already pervasive in the foundational
discourse of Carney (2015) on the tragedy of the horizons. Underlying this logic
is the – very strong – assumption that financial market need just be accompanied
to green the economy through creating incentives to green financial institutions’
balance sheets. As I recall in sub-section 3.3, implicit in this approach is a naïve
and abstract conceptualization of the market that ignores its fundamentally social
nature.
The social-ecological transformation needs long-term planning and clear ob-
jectives, which are both currently missing in the integration of sustainability as
indirect objective in central banking. For instance the purchase of green bonds
through assets purchasing programs (APPs) is not enough in the absence of clear
environmental objectives standing for themselves, to which the programs would be
subjected in line with public policies of social-ecological transformation. Relying
mostly on a market-led logic might lead to act contradictory to environmental
policies. However, adopting such planning and objectives might be contradictory
to the principle of market neutrality (see sub-section 3.3 and section 4).
Finally, concerned with the adequacy to the existing mandates and governance
of central banks, these proposals remain technical: their implementation would
rearrange central banks operations but would not transform the nature of central
banking itself. They remain embedded in a conceptualization of central banking
as the “science” of maintaining price and financial stability. They do not adopt a
conceptualization of central banking as the politics of reflecting the social contract
embedded in money through its role as guarantor of the payment system, which
might lead to other objectives.
3 Reconsidering central banking in light of money
as a non-neutral social relation
Anthropologist, historians and institutionalist economists have shown that money
cannot be defined in an instrumental manner by its attributes. It needs to be
comprehended as a social relation (Ingham, 1996).
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3.1 Money is a social relation
Money is anchored in the representation of the social whole: its legitimacy arises
from social compromises between the different spheres of society. Although het-
erogeneous, all accept money as the universal expression of value and, through
this, adhere to the community. Money is therefore legitimate to the extent that it
relies on symbolic and socio-political sources, and that it acts as the social bond
and ombudsman providing credit for economic development and enabling people
to settle their debts, in particular to the community through taxes (Orléan, 2013;
Théret, 1999). This collective acceptance as a social bond is what gives money its
socio-political nature.
Three levels of trust underlie this legitimacy: methodical trust is the individual
belief stemming from the observation of collective behaviour that everyone else
will accept money; hierarchical trust is the confidence in the authorities managing
money, e.g. central banks, to enforce the monetary regime and to ensure the
status of money as the common unit of account; ethical trust is the adherence
to the collective set of values that ensure social cohesion and lie at the core of
individual membership to the community. Ethical trust supports hierarchical trust,
which itself supports methodical trust. The state stabilizes ethical trust through
establishing it on a set of rules governing the monetary regime. The central bank
enforces the monetary regime but never legitimately replaces the forces that shape
the social compromises supporting this monetary regime. A trust-based money
can then only be a good coordinating instrument if it embodies a good social
compromise (Ould Ahmed and Ponsot, 2014; Théret, 1999).
If these social compromises evolve, this must, therefore, be reflected in the
monetary regime and in the way this regime is governed. Indeed, central banks
itself must submit to the collective values into which money is anchored and that
give money its legitimacy. It follows from this that new social compromises pushing
towards alternative policies — and possibly towards alternative socio-economic
systems — imply an alternative management of money (Aglietta and Brand, 2013).
This justifies a new governance of central banks and pleads for a deeper political
and democratic accountability: political accountability before parliaments as well
as an adequate representation of society within central banks’ committees. Such
a re-embedding of central banks within the political sphere appears as a necessary
condition to build and legitimize a new monetary regime geared towards a social-
ecological transformation.
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3.2 Money is non-neutral
The nature of money as social institution and the endogeneity of the money supply
makes it intrinsically non-neutral. First, money is the language through which
market exchange occurs and through which the political sphere imprint its mark
on the economy. As mean of payment linking agents, money conveys information
that is used by the central bank to take decisions that will, in turn, impacts on
the economic system (Aglietta et al., 2018; Ould Ahmed and Ponsot, 2015). It
is a political medium and an organic link that bonds states and central banks.
This organic link is manifest in the guarantee of central banks’ capital by states.
However, it is incomplete if, conversely, central banks do not guarantee public
debts and do not directly finance states.
Second, money non-neutrality is also due to the endogeneity of the money sup-
ply and the monetary nature of market economies: without money, no production
and exchange can occur. Therefore money not only enables economic activity but
it also shapes it depending on where it flows. This has implications for central
banking.
3.3 Money as a social relation, the endogenous money sup-
ply and the responsive nature of central banking
From what precedes and in what follows, I contend that both the socio-political
nature of money and the endogeneity of the money supply are contradictory with
the political independency of central banks and require a new governance and new
objectives. By political independence I refer to the power of central banks to act
unrelatedly with public policies decided by democratically elected governments,
e.g. the absence of coordination of monetary policy with fiscal policy or with
environmental policy.
The art of central banking is still widely conceptualized as purely technical
and apolitical “science” although central banks are a public institution producing
a fundamental public good: the payment system (Fontan et al., 2018; G. Vallet,
2019). However, the depoliticization of committees and decision making is a very
strong concern of central banking good practices (Morris and Lybek, 2004). This
is highly problematic on five grounds.
First, the apparent depoliticization provides a misleading and fictional picture:
nominations to executive functions in central banks are more often than not highly
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political. The FED provides a good example, with people being nominated by the
US President and confirmed by the Senate. In the case of the ECB, the politi-
cization is more implicit as nominations to the executive board are the result of
negotiations amongst Eurozone countries. Therefore, the perception of central
bankers as apolitical people conducting monetary policy following a robust estab-
lished science is largely undue. Strong interests are a stake through executive
nominations and it does matter that citizens have more control over this process.
Second, the socio-political nature of money entails that the legitimacy of central
banks rests upon the social compromises leading to the universal acceptance of
money. Political independence is tantamount to isolating central banks from these
social compromises. De facto, this dis-embeds central banks from society, in a
polanyan movement accompanying the dis-embeddedness of financial markets and
subjecting society to market logics.
Third, because the different components of society are not represented within
committees, it effectively makes central banks blind to the political consequences
of their policies. It is now widely acknowledged that quantitative easing policies
had distributional consequences.3 They increased wealth inequalities in favour-
ing stocks and likely also real estate owners. The dogma of the ECB’s market
neutrality — purchasing financial assets according to their share in total market
capitalization — led to distorting financing conditions of private firms towards
carbon intensive activities (Dafermos et al., 2020; Fontan, 2017; Fontan et al.,
2018; Matikainen et al., 2017; van ‘t Klooster and Fontan, 2019). This might po-
tentially have slowed down the energy transition and goes contra policies decided
by democratically elected government. Further it fosters financing of carbon in-
tensive activities and therefore increases climate-related financial instability risks
(Dafermos et al., 2020).
As it has economic, financial, environmental and social consequences, market
“neutrality” is neither market and politically neutral. It is a pure ideological fiction
grounded in an understanding of the market as a self-adjusting total whole isolated
from society and conveyor of an absolute truth agents and institutions should abide
by. This understanding of the market is naïve even within the neoclassical core
framework as it ignores the non-systematic convergence towards equilibrium of
perfectly competitive markets (Debreu, 1974; Mantel, 1974; Sonnenschein, 1973).
Further, it ignores that markets are social constructs existing in very various forms
3See the chapters of the first section of this book.
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and requiring pre-conditions to exist – collective action, political deliberation, law
and money. This naïve and abstract understanding of markets leads to treat society
as a market auxiliary (Douai and Montalban, 2015; Polanyi, 2001). It does not
allow to consider the role of other institutions – including the central bank – in the
social construction of markets. Finally, since money is non-neutral and there is no
such thing as a market without money, the very nature of money precludes any
kind of market neutrality of monetary policy. No more than money neutrality does
the concept of market neutrality have any sound conceptual and policy-relevant
foundations.
Fourth, depoliticization of central banks – real or apparent – exacerbates the
lack of democratic legitimacy in an era where central banks have increasingly ven-
tured into the political realm through their expanding powers after the 2007 crisis.
The post-crisis action of central banks reflected a stronger sense of accountability
before the financial industry rather than before citizens, as central banks’ inde-
pendence is seen as a credibility signal sent to financial markets (Fontan et al.,
2018).
Fifth, not only is political independence of central banks problematic in a world
where money is a social relation resting on political compromises. It is equally
problematic in a world of endogenous money supply. The determination of the
money supply by the volume (how much money is demanded?) and of its desti-
nation by the composition (for what purpose is money demanded?) of economic
activity creates de facto a structural tendency for central banks to be a responsive
rather than a prescriptive institution regarding developments of financial markets
and of the productive structure of the economy. In theory, central banks are
forward-looking institutions and have a say on economic developments through
their refinancing role of banks. In practice, refusing to refinance a bank would be
tantamount at creating havoc in the economic and financial system. This say is
therefore extremely tenuous, for central banks are essentially limited to accompany
economic dynamics rather than to fashion them. This is reflected in their daily
operations, which are essentially of a responsive nature. At no point do central
banks exert quantitative control over the amount of reserves for that would cause
huge fluctuations in the short-run interest rate. They proceed to balance sheet
operations to smooth the amount of reserves and ensure that their target interest
rate is reached. Central banks accommodate any refinancing need expressed by
commercial banks at the target interest rate (Lavoie, 2014).
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Political independency of central banks in spite of both the socio-political na-
ture of money and the endogenous money supply is therefore tantamount at de
facto dependency to the economic and financial system. This is reflected in the
influence of the market constituency through the structural power exerted by fi-
nancial markets over monetary policy and financial supervision (Fontan et al.,
2018; G. Vallet, 2019). It is further reflected in the responsive nature of central
banks’ operations. This calls for a new governance, new objectives and a renewed
set of instruments.
4 Renewing central banking: bringing society
back in, shifting objectives
These five points indicate that central banks are ill equipped to accompany, let
alone foster, positive social changes. Challenging their independence is thus not
about re-politicizing them — they never stopped to be political institutions mak-
ing political choices. It is about rebalancing their politicization in a way that
unveils the non-neutrality of monetary policy, and is consistent and evolves with
democratically deliberated societal goals, e.g. a social-ecological transformation.
4.1 Central banks’ governance and political accountability
Reforming central banks governance and political accountability can be done in
two complementary ways. First, ideally, central banks should be politically ac-
countable before parliaments and come back under a more direct control of cit-
izens. Second, immediately, it requires to reform the composition of the various
committees. The composition of central banks’ committees determines the ratio-
nality of central banks in interpreting the information coming from the payment
system and in taking their decisions (Aglietta et al., 2018). The composition of
committees also favours regulatory capture by vested interest due to sociological
and ideological proximity as well as revolving doors between central banks and
the finance industry. For instance, representatives of the finance industry are by
very far the most numerous in the ECB’s twenty-two advisory committees (Fontan
et al., 2018; G. Vallet, 2019). As for every place of power, the sociology and career
backgrounds of committee members matters.
A renewed governance would combine the necessary technical expertise on
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money and finance (which may not only come from economics and finance but
also from history, anthropology or sociology) with a wider expertise equipping
central banks with the ability to foresee the impacts of their policy on society and
the environment. This requires committee members with various backgrounds
(also in social and environmental sciences), gendered balanced (G. Vallet, 2019)
and ideally of various social and ethnic origins. It further requires to impose a
significant and sufficiently high number of representatives outside of the financial
industry: Beyond other sectors of the economy, labour unions and environmen-
tal organizations should have reserved seats in advisory and executive committees.
Some high income countries central banks already exhibit such arrangements. The
law regarding the FED’s board states that "the President shall have due regard to
a fair representation of the financial, agricultural, industrial, and commercial in-
terests, and geographical divisions of the country".4 The central bank of Australia’s
board includes members of various public and civil society organizations, including
environmental ones.5
Without changing anything else to their current legal and operating frame-
works, such a shift in representation within central banks’ committees would al-
ready be an interesting step forward to align monetary policy with societal goals.
This would limit the risk for the central bank to be misaligned with social demands
and to deepen its democratic deficit. In neoclassical terms, this could be expressed
as populating monetary committees in line with the median voter’s preferences.
4.2 Emancipating central banks’ mandate from price sta-
bility: an ecological post-Keynesian view
Dikau and Volz (2019) find that over a sample of 133 central banks, 12% have
explicit sustainability objectives in their mandate, 29% have mandate to support
governments’ policy that may include sustainability goals and 59% have no man-
date ensuring they would tackle environmental issues. However, even amongst
the latter, central banks could engage with those issues through their traditional
objectives of price and financial stability: environmental issues, most prominently
climate-related risks, are likely to impact prices and financial outcomes (Battiston
et al., 2017; Bolton et al., 2020, Svartzman, this volume). A major concern of cen-
4https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/12/241, accessed June 10, 2021.
5https://www.rba.gov.au/about-rba/boards/rba-board.html, accessed June 10, 2021.
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tral bankers, however, is conflicts amongst objectives that may not be all satisfied
in the meantime – that is to say trade-offs (Couppey-Soubeyran and Kalinowski,
2021; Weber and Calza, 2021). A major cultural and theoretical shift in the “sci-
ence” of central banking in thus needed when it comes to the objectives and their
hierarchy included in their mandates.
Both the endogeneity of the money supply and the socio-political nature of
money pleads for getting rid of the objective of price stability. In theory, inflation
can be a monetary phenomenon in two cases: (1) if a net monetary creation
occurs in a situation of full employment and full capacity utilization, where the
output cannot be increased anymore to match the additional stock of money; (2)
if confidence in money decreases to the point where people are reluctant to accept
it as the universal unit of account.
The first case corresponds to the monetarist view that posits an exogenous
control of the money supply by central banks. This view remains the official
central banking doxa and the main source of inspiration of central banks’ mandates
despite practices geared towards targeting interest rates instead of the money
supply (Fontana and Palacio-Vera, 2003; Fullwiler, 2017). Obviously, in a world
of endogenous determination of the money supply, it does not make sense, as
post-Keynesians have known for long. The endogeneity of the money supply is
now recognized by central bankers (McLeay et al., 2014) and by New Keynesian
economists as shown by the replacement of the LM curve by the MP curve (a
Taylor rule) in the textbook three equations model (Carlin and Soskice, 2009).
However, New Keynesians still consider that monetary policy has a direct impact
on inflation through the difference between the central bank’s interest rate and
the natural interest rate à la Wicksell. If the central bank’s rate is lower than the
natural interest rate, inflationary pressures appear because of over-activity. We
see that underlying the natural rate of interest is the same understanding of the
market as for the concept of market neutrality. The theory of the natural rate of
interest further assumes that the central bank does not affect it by its operations.
To the contrary, post-Keynesians deny the existence of a natural interest rate or
posit that there exists a multiplicity of it. If there is no such thing as a natural
rate of interest, this allows for more creativity in central banking because then the
focus can be on something else than inflation (Lavoie, 2014). Finally, even if there
were a natural rate of interest, the extent to which the interest rate plays a role in
investment decisions and thus on the level of economic activity is uncertain.
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It follows that only the second case is of practical relevance. The role of cen-
tral banks in achieving price stability lies in their action as the guarantor of the
monetary regime and of the payment system integrity. As such, central banks
ensure the permanence of money as the universal unit of account. It is through
their role of enforcing trust in money that central banks act against inflation, not
through monetary policy per se. It results from this that price stability needs not
be the primary objective of central banking, or even an objective at all. The mere
existence of central banks should be sufficient if they are legitimate and credible in
their ability to preserve the payment system. To avoid a sudden and potentially
destabilizing cultural shock, price stability could remain a cosmetic subsidiary ob-
jective for some time. This does not mean that monetary and financial stability
should not be objectives of central banks anymore.
Drawing the logical conclusions from the double endogeneity of money, achiev-
ing monetary and financial stability lies in the ability to reflect broader social
compromises. It is entangled with general socioeconomic stability and other poli-
cies, e.g. fiscal policy. However, current central banks’ operating frameworks do
not allow for addressing these interlinkages (Dow, 2017). Central banks’ man-
dates should, therefore, be geared towards the complementarity of monetary pol-
icy with economic, social and environmental policies. This is in line with the
post-Keynesian theory of central banking. As Dow (2017, p. 1543) puts it, "eco-
nomic and financial stability are the more appropriate primary goals of central
bank policy, alongside government, from which monetary stability would follow.
(. . . ) Post Keynesian central bank policy includes such factors as concern with
the distribution of income and wealth, and concern with the trust in institutions
which support money as a social relation." An explicit ecological dimension needs
to be added. A renewed mandate for a social-ecological central bank could go
like this: The mission of the central bank is to achieve economic and financial
stability through fostering full employment, social cohesion and relevant economic
development within the ecological limits of the planet. The terms social cohesion
and relevant will be the place of power struggles, as well as the precise definition
of the planet’s ecological limits. The exact interpretation of the mandate would
thus be the result of the social compromises at play. At least would such a man-
date create an institutional space for "monetary contestations" (Ould Ahmed and
Ponsot, 2015) pushing towards a new monetary regime.
A renewed central banks governance is thus needed to implement such a man-
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date, as discussed earlier. Combining this renewed mandate with a renewed gov-
ernance and political accountability would transform central banks from a tech-
nocratic body of monetary regulation to a democratic institution of monetary
emission. Further, such a mandate requires to break with the responsive nature
of central banks’ operations. In what follows, I discuss some instruments in line
with such renewed mandate, governance and political accountability.
5 Renewing central banking: instruments for pre-
scription rather than reaction
Despite the critical stance in section 2, the instruments discussed here retain a line
of continuity with the proposals surveyed. They can thus appear much less radical
than the discussion so far. In fact, they can be as revolutionary if embedded within
a politically accountable central bank with appropriate governance and mandate as
they can be gently reformist if integrated in current central banking arrangements.
Radicalness lies less in the instruments themselves than in the distribution of power
over them, in who gets to control them and who gets to decide for what purpose
they are used.
In that regard, an important point is the need for a clear and strict taxonomy of
activities in terms of their environmental (un)sustainability. A telling example is
the European green taxonomy aiming at labelling assets in line with climate, pol-
lution, circularity, natural resources and biodiversity considerations (EU Technical
Expert Group on Sustainable Finance, 2019). It is aptly debated and contested
to decide what environmental impact threshold for each category will determine
the greenness of an activity, whether nuclear or natural gas should be included,
or what is exactly a sustainable management of forest (C. Vallet, 2021). Also, the
taxonomy aims at indicating what is green, but does not indicate what activities
are “brown” and harming the European Union’s environmental objectives (van ‘t
Klooster and van Tilburg, 2020). Ultimately, such a taxonomy is therefore the
product of power struggles between different interests.
However, the taxonomy approach leaves aside two key issues. First, it does
not tackle the issue of the volume of the production. Indeed, an activity can
be environmentally sustainable up to some level of production and unsustainable
beyond. Underlying here is of course the issue of ecological limits to growth.
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Second, and related, the taxonomy approach gives a frame to assess assets in light
of environmental standards but does not set clear environmental objectives. These
two planning aspects are central to a social-ecological transformation and therefore
need to be taken into account in the design of the instruments used by the central
bank, in line with renewed democratic legitimacy and mandate. The choice of
the taxonomy framing, what is included and what is not, and clear environmental
objectives inscribed in monetary policy and aligned with environmental policies
are a place of contestations that will determine the extent to which the instruments
discussed here would effectively foster a social-ecological transformation.
I will discuss three complementary instruments acting through several channels
of monetary policy transmission: (i) differentiated target interest rates to act
through the interest rate channel, (ii) credit control to act through the credit
channel and (iii) qualitative tightening in APPs to act both through the financial
market and fiscal channels. The aim of these instruments is to shape and orient
the economy in a given direction. They aim at being market non-neutral: where
money enters the economy does matter (van ‘t Klooster and Fontan, 2019).
5.1 Differentiated target interest rates
I first argue for differentiated target interest rates to discriminate between sustain-
able and unsustainable activities, e.g. between the fossil and non-fossil economies.
This proposal is not very different from a GTLTRO (van ‘t Klooster and van
Tilburg, 2020) but would be based on clear and planned environmental objectives
and not solely on the compliance of loans and collaterals to a taxonomy of green
activities. It would create de facto two interbank markets, for liquidities aimed at
each type of activities. This would further reveal to the central bank which banks
lend to which kind of activity, better equipping the renewed monetary committees
to adapt interest rates to reach the mandate objectives in clear coordination with
governmental policies.
The system would work as a mix between the ceiling and the floor systems of
interest rate targeting (Lavoie, 2014). On the ceiling side, the amount of clearing
balances for loans to unsustainable activities would be set much below the demand
for reserves for these loans. Banks in need of refinancing would compete on the
interbank market to borrow these reserves, thus pushing the short-term interest
rate upwards towards the central bank’s lending facility rate on reserves for loans
to unsustainable activities. Banks ending up with a net negative position would
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borrow from the central bank at this rate, which could be regularly increased
depending on the banks volume of lending to these activities and according to
clear environmental objectives. For instance, an annual rate of decarbonisation
of banks’ balance sheet would be set in accordance with a climate objective of
1.5 degrees or less and the central bank short-term interest rate would increase
at least according to this decarbonisation rate. Moreover, pledged collaterals not
complying with environmental standards would become progressively ineligible as
counterparts to liquidities, ensuring that banks would need to have a sufficient
proportion of loans to sustainable activities in their balance sheet if they wish to
continue lending to unsustainable ones.
Conversely, on the floor side, the amount of clearing balances for loans to sus-
tainable activities would be set in a large excess amount, pushing the target interest
rate downwards toward the lending facility rate on reserves for loans to sustain-
able activities. Banks would normally not need to borrow from the central bank
but if they do they would borrow at this rate, which could be regularly decreased
according to the evolution of banks’ loans portfolio, to the pledged collaterals and
to the environmental objectives. For both kinds of reserve, the central bank would
then accommodate any bank in need at the corresponding interest rate. From the
standpoint of banks, a “shadow” rate would thus emerge as the weighted average
of both rates, depending on the volume of each kind of reserves that would be
borrowed. The more the banks would lend to sustainable activities, the lower the
“shadow” rate and the cheaper they would refinance themselves.
Note that the rate for loans to non-sustainable activities may eventually be
infinitum: these activities would simply be denied the right to be financed at some
point and excluded from access to money and the payment system. They would
thus be removed from the division of labour as accepted by society. Differentiated
target interest rates would then send a strong signal to banks as to where their
liquidity preference should stand. This would contribute to fixing agents’ anticipa-
tions and ensure monetary policy transmission through the interest rate channel.
Unsustainable activities would face a strong liquidity preference of banks in fear
of high uncertainty regarding the future of these activities. Near the end of the
social-ecological transformation period, the liquidity preference of banks towards
unsustainable activities will turn infinitum, and so the interest rate, when there is
no more uncertainty but certainty that these activities will go extinct. Any loan to
these activities would be doom to default and therefore be fully illiquid, eventually
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turning into a liability to be absorbed by the banks’ equity capital. Conversely,
banks’ preference for liquidity towards sustainable activities would decrease given
the lower uncertainty on their future development and the lower default risk trig-
gered by a lower interest rate. Near the end of the social-ecological transformation
period, the central bank target rate for banks loans to sustainable activities could
converge to zero.
5.2 Credit control
Because differentiated target interest rates work as an incentive but ultimately
rely on the will and ability of banks to allocate capital in relevant sectors, it is
important to complement them with more coercive measures ensuring that money
will effectively flow in the right places. Credit control policies are an effective way
to control the direction of their liquidities (Bezemer et al., 2018; Monnet, 2014)
and to ensure that this direction matches with democratically deliberated policies
and clear objectives, e.g. forcing commercial banks to lend minimum or maximum
amount of credit to specific sectors. This was done before in history. For instance,
in the post-war French monetary system, the Banque de France controlled the
quantity and the direction of credit through the registration of all credits at the
National Credit Council. This proved a very effective way to foster reconstruction
and credit control measures affected the economy very rapidly (Monnet, 2014,
2019).
Through exerting credit control based on democratically deliberated rules, cen-
tral banks would be the institution through which society decides who, and for
what purpose, is allowed to enter into debt and to undertake a given economic
activity. In this perspective, credit control is a way to formalize a debt relation
between a particular agent and the society as a whole to carry on an activity
socially validated according to some criteria and objectives, e.g. environmental
sustainability. It expresses the idea that money embeds a social contract and is
ultimately a debt of society to itself (Aglietta and Brand, 2013).
Although powerful, differentiated target interest rates and credit control are,
however, insufficient. Indeed, nowadays, central banks’ intervention happens mainly
through the purchase of financial assets. This development has become very impor-
tant due to non-conventional monetary policy (Couppey-Soubeyran and Delandre,
2021). It is therefore necessary to act concurrently on APPs.
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5.3 Qualitative tightening in assets purchasing programs
Qualitative tightening in APPs consists of restraining gradually but significantly
and regularly the universe of unsustainable activities-linked financial assets eligi-
ble to purchase by the central bank and symmetrically widening the universe of
sustainable assets eligible. To ensure consistency and complementarity of mone-
tary policy instruments, it should be done concurrently with the revision of the
collateral framework applying to the lending operations of the central bank as in
differentiated target interest rates and credit controls.
With the advent of unconventional monetary policies, the creation of liquidities
by the central bank is to a great extent steered by the purchase of financial assets
to banks and non-banks financial institutions. This has transformed a whole range
of financial assets into quasi-money as the agents emitting assets eligible to APPs
anticipate that they will be bought by the central bank and thus consider them as
money. If the central bank buys these assets to a bank, it increases the quantity of
reserves and thus improves the liquidity of the financial system. If the central bank
buys these assets to a non-bank financial institution, it increases both the quantity
of reserves and of deposits, thus increasing the money supply as well (Couppey-
Soubeyran and Delandre, 2021; Gabor and Vestergaard, 2016). Through APPs,
the central bank thus acts effectively as the bank of the financial sector as a whole
and not only of banks anymore. In the eyes of the financial sector, the roles of
central bank and commercial bank are fused into the central bank. If the central
bank can do it for the financial sector, it can do it for any corporate and public
sectors.
Qualitatively tightening APPs would, therefore, be a powerful tool to an-
chor agents’ expectations towards the social-ecological transformation through
signalling that some activities will not be financed much longer. It is also a way
to pass on the risk associated with these activities fully on those who finance
them through avoiding assets swaps with sustainable, safer or more liquid assets.
In essence, it makes central banks’ balance sheet operations prescriptive towards
markets as assets linked to unsustainable activities would become ineligible and
ensure monetary policy transmission through the financial markets channel. It
would also prevent banks from financing unsustainable activities through selling
the assets linked to these activities. Finally, qualitative tightening with respect to
sustainability further presents the advantage of gradually cleaning central banks’
balance sheets from future stranded assets, e.g. carbon intensive assets. This
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would avoid any socialization of risks or losses attached to these assets.
Qualitative tightening would affect the volume of APPs to the extent that
unsustainable activities dominate in financial markets. The purchase of sustainable
assets by central banks, e.g. green bonds, would increase their price and decrease
the attached interest rate, thus easing the financing conditions of these activities.
In contrast, it would decrease the price of unsustainable assets, e.g. brown bonds,
and increase their interest rate, mirroring the dynamics of the target interest rates.
Qualitative tightening would thus modify the relative price and rate of return of
assets (Tobin, 1969) and be market shaping.
It is important to stress that qualitative tightening should affect all kinds of
APPs: not only those for the corporate sector (e.g. CSPPs), but those for the
public sector as well (PSPPs). This is a requirement to ensure that the central bank
act in coordination with public policies. It is also necessary to reach environmental
objectives. The relative shares of the ECB APPs in total asset purchases provide
a compelling example, as shown on table 1.
ABSPP CBPP3 CSPP PSPP APP total
Holdings as of April 2021 28,432 289,418 271,075 2,393,239 2,982,164
Shares 0.95% 9.70% 9.09% 80.25% 100%
Table 1: Holding of financial assets by the ECB in millions euros at amortized
cost. ABSPP: asset backed securities purchasing program. CBPP3 : covered
bonds purchasing program. CSPP: corporate sector purchasing program. PSPP:
public sector purchasing program. Source: https://www.ecb.europa.eu/mopo/
implement/app/html/index.en.html, accessed June 10, 2021.
As we can see, purchases of public sector assets amount for 80% of the total
APPs. A direct financing of public institutions by central bank conditioned upon
assets eligibility according to environmental and social criteria would thus solve the
issue of the financing of the social-ecological transformation and ensure satisfaction
of monetary policy objectives through the fiscal channel. Further, as discussed in
sub-section 3.2, it would complete the organic link between the central bank and
the state through complementing the state guaranty of central banks’ capital by
direct borrowing by the state from the central bank. It would then give further
concrete expression to the transformation of the nature of central banking away
from markets logics into politics of enforcing the social contract embedded in
money and reflecting social demands and socio-political compromises.
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5.4 Complementarity between differentiated target inter-
est rates, qualitative tightening and credit control
There is a strong complementarity between the three instruments. Differentiated
target interest rates ensure that a merit order in financing takes place where banks
prioritize lending to sustainable activities. Credit control allows central banks to
directly monitor and control credit allocation. Qualitative tightening allows to
shape the interest rate structure on the bond markets in favour of sustainable ac-
tivities. It further prevents swapping unsustainable assets for sustainable, safer or
more liquid ones and from selling unsustainable assets to the central bank through
APPs. Qualitative tightening thus forces agents to bear all the risk attached to
these assets.
In the perspective of money as a social relation, gradually tightening and can-
celling the funding of unsustainable activities reflects new social compromises sup-
porting a social-ecological transformation and the growing social demand for en-
vironmental sustainability. Through these operations, central banks delink unsus-
tainable activities from the social whole through removing them from the social
division of labour. These instruments would express the new social compromises
inscribed in money, in line with its socio-political nature.
6 Discussion and conclusion: consequences for
monetary theory, institutional complementar-
ity and compatibility with a post-growth econ-
omy
In terms of monetary theory, it is worth noting that these instruments do not
change the endogenous determination of the money supply but may bring some
degrees of exogeneity in. Even if central banks can exert some control over the
quantity of money in circulation through credit control and take the initiative to
create money through APPs, monetary creation within these quantities remains
a function of the demand for money. Whatever the architecture of the monetary
system, no monetary creation can occur without a socially validated demand for
money expressed by economic agents. However, it is true that money creation
through APPs brings some ambiguity in the endogeneity/exogeneity distinction:
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indeed, the demand for money by agents could be partly triggered by expectations
of assets purchase initiated by the central bank.
In terms of institutional complementarity (Amable, 2016), to the extent that
unsustainable activities still dominate in the economy, strongly tightening financ-
ing conditions for these activities will de facto constrain the total quantity of
money. It is then clear that this new monetary regime should be implemented
within the construction of a new (non/dis-)accumulation regime as a whole. Oth-
erwise, if applied to a business-as-usual economic structure, an institutional mis-
match would emerge with the new monetary regime. This would cause major
economic turmoil in the form of a big recession due to a lack of financing. In
this case, the endogeneity of money would strongly manifest itself through a cri-
sis. There needs to be a dynamic consistency between the monetary regime, the
productive structure and other key institutions.
Finally, these three instruments are compatible with a post-growth economy.
There is no accounting incompatibility of debt-money and interest rates with a
non-growing economy (Cahen-Fourot and Lavoie, 2016; Richters and Siemoneit,
2017). Moreover, embedded in a monetary system functioning according to societal
relevance, interest rates can be used as a transformation tool. Credit control is a
tool central banks can use to direct commercial banks’ credit to relevant activities.
There is no reason why it could not be used in a post-growth society if money is
created for societal rather than accumulation motives. Qualitative tightening is a
tool central banks can use to shift risk-return profiles of given activities and direct
their own liquidities towards relevant activities through APPs. It can be used
in a post-growth economy as a direct financing mechanism. The compatibility
of these instruments with a post-growth economy depends on who controls them
and for what purpose. Embedded in the right social relations, they could be the
foundation of a social-ecological monetary regime.
References
Aglietta, Michel and Brand, Thomas (2013), Un New Deal pour l’Europe, Paris:
Odile Jacob, 305 pp.
Aglietta, Michel, Espagne, Etienne, and Perrissin Fabert, Baptiste (2015), Une
Proposition Pour Financer l’investissement Bas Carbone En Europe, La note
d’Analyse 24, France Stratégie.
22
Aglietta, Michel, Ould Ahmed, Pepita, and Ponsot, Jean-François (2018), Money:
5,000 Years of Debt and Power, London ; New York: Verso, 421 pp.
Amable, Bruno (2016), Institutional Complementarities in the Dynamic Compar-
ative Analysis of Capitalism, Journal of Institutional Economics 12.1, pp. 79–
103, doi: 10.1017/S1744137415000211.
Ayres, Robert U. (1999), The Second Law, the Fourth Law, Recycling and Limits
to Growth, Ecological Economics 29.3, pp. 473–483, doi: 10.1016/S0921-
8009(98)00098-6.
Barmes, David and Livingstone, Zack (2021), The Green Central Banking Score-
card. How Green Are G20 Central Banks and Financial Supervisors. Positive
Money UK, p. 56.
Battiston, Stefano, Mandel, Antoine, Monasterolo, Irene, Schütze, Franziska, and
Visentin, Gabriele (2017), A Climate Stress-Test of the Financial System, Na-
ture Climate Change 7, pp. 283–288.
Bezemer, Dirk, Ryan-Collins, Josh, Van Lerven, Frank, and Zhang, Lu (2018),
Credit Where It’s Due: A Historical, Theoretical and Empirical Review of
Credit Guidance Policies in the 20th Century, UCL Institute for Innovation
and Public Purpose Working Paper Series 2018-11.
Bolton, Patrick, Desprès, Morgan, Awazu Pereira da Silva, Luiz, Samama, Frédéric,
and Svarzman, Romain (2020), The Green Swan - Central Banking and Finan-
cial Stability in the Age of Climate Change, Bank for International Settlements,
p. 115.
Bouckaert, Stéphanie, Fernandez Pales, Araceli, McGlade, Christophe, Remme,
Uwe, Wanner, Brent, Varro, Laszlo, D’Ambrosio, Davide, and Spencer, Thomas
(2021), Net Zero by 2050 - A Roadmap for the Global Energy Sector, Interna-
tional Energy Agency, p. 224.
Cahen-Fourot, Louison (2022), Central Banking for a Social-Ecological Transfor-
mation, in: The Future of Central Banking, ed. by Sylvio Antonio Kappes,
Louis-Philippe Rochon, and Guillaume Vallet, Edward Elgar.
Cahen-Fourot, Louison and Lavoie, Marc (2016), Ecological Monetary Economics:
A Post-Keynesian Critique, Ecological Economics 126, pp. 163–168, doi: 10.
1016/j.ecolecon.2016.03.007.
Campiglio, Emanuele (2016), Beyond Carbon Pricing: The Role of Banking and
Monetary Policy in Financing the Transition to a Low-Carbon Economy, Eco-
logical Economics 121, pp. 220–230, doi: 10.1016/j.ecolecon.2015.03.020.
23
Campiglio, Emanuele, Dafermos, Yannis, Monnin, Pierre, Ryan-Collins, Josh, Schot-
ten, Guido, and Tanaka, Misa (2018), Climate Change Challenges for Central
Banks and Financial Regulators, Nature Climate Change 8.6, pp. 462–468, doi:
10.1038/s41558-018-0175-0.
Carlin, Wendy and Soskice, David (2009), Teaching Intermediate Macroeconomics
Using the 3-Equation Model, in: Macroeconomic Theory and Macroeconomic
Pedagogy, ed. by Giuseppe Fontana and Mark Setterfield, Basingstoke ; New
York: Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 13–35.
Carney, Mark (Sept. 29, 2015), “Breaking the Tragedy of the Horizon - Climate
Change and Financial Stability”, Speech (Lloyd’s of London).
Couppey-Soubeyran, Jézabel and Delandre, Pierre (2021), Pour une monnaie au
service du bien commun, Paris: Institut Veblen pour les réformes économiques,
p. 43.
Couppey-Soubeyran, Jézabel and Kalinowski, Wojtek (2021),When Central Banks
Outline Their Options for Climate Action. Analysis of the Latest NGFS Report
on the “Greening” of Monetary Authorities Actions, Institut Veblen pour les
réformes économiques, p. 11.
D’Orazio, Paola and Popoyan, Lilit (2019), Fostering Green Investments and Tack-
ling Climate-Related Financial Risks: Which Role for Macroprudential Poli-
cies?, Ecological Economics 160, pp. 25–37.
Dafermos, Yannis, Gabor, Daniela, Nikolaidi, Maria, Pawloff, Adam, and van Ler-
ven, Frank (2020), Decarbonising Is Easy: Beyond Market Neutrality in the
ECB’s Corporate QE, London: New Economics Foundation.
De Santis, Roberto A., Roos, Madelaine, Hettler, Katja, and Tamburrini, Fabio
(2018), Purchases of Green Bonds under the Eurosystem’s Asset Purchase Pro-
gramme, ECB Economic Bulletin 7.
Debreu, Gerard (1974), Excess Demand Functions, Journal of Mathematical Eco-
nomics 1.1, pp. 15–21, doi: 10.1016/0304-4068(74)90032-9.
Dikau, Simon and Volz, Ulrich (2019), Central Bank Mandates, Sustainability Ob-
jectives and the Promotion of Green Finance, SOAS Department of Economics
Working Paper Series 222.
Douai, Ali and Montalban, Matthieu (2015), Construction (sociale) des marchés
et régulations environnementales : un point de vue institutionnaliste, Revue
internationale de droit economique XXIX.2, pp. 211–235.
24
Dow, Sheila (2017), Central Banking in the Twenty-First Century, Cambridge
Journal of Economics 41.6, pp. 1539–1557, doi: 10.1093/cje/bex051.
Energy Transitions Commission (Nov. 2018), Mission possible: Reaching net-zero
carbon emissions from harder-to-abate sectors by mid-century, p. 172.
EU Technical Expert Group on Sustainable Finance (2019), Financing a Sustain-
able European Economy. Taxonomy Technical Report.
Fontan, Clément (2017), La BCE peut-elle mener une politique « industrielle » à
la place des États ?, La Revue nouvelle 6, pp. 67–74.
Fontan, Clément, Carré, Emmanuel, and L’Oeillet, Guillaume (2018), Theoretical
Perspectives on the New Era of Central Banking, French Politics 16.4, pp. 453–
470, doi: 10.1057/s41253-018-0067-8.
Fontana, Giuseppe and Palacio-Vera, Alfonso (June 1, 2003), Is There an Active
Role for Monetary Policy in the Endogenous Money Approach?, Journal of
Economic Issues 37.2, pp. 511–517, doi: 10.1080/00213624.2003.11506600.
Fullwiler, Scott T. (2017), Modern Central-Bank Operations: The General Prin-
ciples, in: Modern Central-Bank Operations: The General Principles, ed. by
Louis-Philippe Rochon and Sergio Rossi, Edward Elgar Publishing.
Gabor, Daniela and Vestergaard, Jakob (2016), Towards a Theory of Shadow
Money, INET Working Papers.
Glucina, Mark David and Mayumi, Kozo (2010), Connecting Thermodynamics
and Economics: Well-Lit Roads and Burned Bridges, Annals of the New York
Academy of Sciences 1185.1, pp. 11–29, doi: 10.1111/j.1749-6632.2009.
05166.x.
Guttmann, Robert (2002), Money and Credit in Régulation Theory, in: Regulation
Theory: The State of the Art, ed. by Robert Boyer and Yves Saillard, Routledge,
pp. 57–63.
Haberl, Helmut, Wiedenhofer, Dominik, Virág, Doris, Kalt, Gerald, Plank, Bar-
bara, Brockway, Paul, Fishman, Tomer, Hausknost, Daniel, Krausmann, Fridolin
P., Leon-Gruchalski, Bartholomäus, Mayer, Andreas, Pichler, Melanie, Schaf-
fartzik, Anke, Sousa, Tânia, Streeck, Jan, and Creutzig, Felix (2020), A Sys-
tematic Review of the Evidence on Decoupling of GDP, Resource Use and GHG
Emissions, Part II: Synthesizing the Insights, Environmental Research Letters,
doi: 10.1088/1748-9326/ab842a.
Hickel, Jason and Kallis, Giorgos (2020), Is Green Growth Possible?, New Political
Economy 25.4, pp. 469–486, doi: 10.1080/13563467.2019.1598964.
25
Ingham, Geoffrey (1996), Money Is a Social Relation, Review of Social Economy
54.4, pp. 507–529, JSTOR: 29769872.
Keyßer, Lorenz T. and Lenzen, Manfred (2021), 1.5 °C Degrowth Scenarios Suggest
the Need for New Mitigation Pathways, Nature Communications 12.1, p. 2676,
doi: 10.1038/s41467-021-22884-9.
Labrousse, Agnès and Michel, Sandrine (2017), Accumulation Regimes, in: The
Routledge Handbook of Heterodox Economics, ed. by Tae-Hee Jo, Lynne Chester,
and Carlo D’Ippoliti, Abingdon, Oxon ; New York, NY: Routledge, pp. 54–69.
Lavoie, Marc (2014), Post-Keynesian Economics: New Foundations, Northampton,
MA: Edward Elgar, 680 pp.
Mantel, Rolf R. (1974), On the Characterization of Aggregate Excess Demand,
Journal of Economic Theory 7.3, pp. 348–353.
Masson-Delmotte, Valérie, Zhai, Panöao, Pörtner, Hans-Otto, Roberts, DEbra,
Skea, JIm, Shukla, Priyadarshi R., Pirani, Anna, Moufouma-Okia, Wilfran,
Péan, Clotilde, Pidcock, Roz, Connors, Sarah, Matthews, J. B. Matthews,
Chen, Yang, Zhou, Xiao, Gomis, Melissa I., Lonnoy, Elisabeth, Maycock, Tom,
Tignor, Melinda, and Waterfield, Tim (2018), Global Warming of 1.5°C. An
IPCC Special Report on the Impacts of Global Warming of 1.5°C above Pre-
Industrial Levels and Related Global Greenhouse Gas Emission Pathways, in
the Context of Strengthening the Global Response to the Threat of Climate
Change, Sustainable Development, and Efforts to Eradicate Poverty, Intergov-
ernmental Panel on Climate Change.
Matikainen, Sini, Campiglio, Emanuele, and Zenghelis, Dimitri (2017), The Cli-
mate Impact of Quantitative Easing, Grantham Research Institute on Climate
and the Environment Policy Paper, p. 36.
McLeay, Michael, Radia, Amar, and Thomas, Ryland (2014), Money Creation in
the Modern Economy, Bank of England Quarterly Bulletin 54.1, pp. 14–27.
Monnet, Eric (2014), Monetary Policy without Interest Rates: Evidence from
France’s Golden Age (1948 to 1973) Using a Narrative Approach, American
Economic Journal: Macroeconomics 6.4, pp. 137–169, doi: 10.1257/mac.6.
4.137.
— (2019), Controlling Credit: Central Banking and the Planned Economy in Post-
war France, 1948-1973, Cambridge University Press, 327 pp.
26
Morris, JoAnne and Lybek, Tonny (2004), Central Bank Governance: A Survey
of Boards and Management, IMF Working Papers 04.226, doi: 10 . 5089 /
9781451875416.001.
OECD (2019a), Biodiversity: Finance and the Economic and Business Case for
Action, Report prepared for the G7 Environment Ministers’s Meeting 5-6 May.
— (2019b), Global Material Resources Outlook to 2060: Economic Drivers and En-
vironmental Consequences, OECD Publishing, doi: 10.1787/9789264307452-
en.
Orléan, André (2013), La sociologie économique de la monnaie, in: Traité de so-
ciologie économique, ed. by Philippe Steiner, Presses Universitaires de France,
pp. 207–238.
Ould Ahmed, Pepita and Ponsot, Jean-François (2014), La monnaie, la valeur et
la règle. Entretien avec Michel Aglietta, Revue de la régulation. Capitalisme,
institutions, pouvoirs 16, doi: 10.4000/regulation.10998.
— (2015), Contestations monétaires : une économie politique de la monnaie. Intro-
duction, Revue de la régulation. Capitalisme, institutions, pouvoirs 18, pp. 1–
11, doi: 10.4000/regulation.11593.
Polanyi, Karl (2001), The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic Ori-
gins of Our Time, Boston: Beacon Press (1944).
Richters, Oliver and Siemoneit, Andreas (2017), Consistency and Stability Anal-
ysis of Models of a Monetary Growth Imperative, Ecological Economics 136,
pp. 114–125.
Rochon, Louis-Philippe and Seccareccia, Mario (2013), Monetary Economies of
Production: Banking and Financial Circuits and the Role of the State, Chel-
tenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd, 304 pp.
Rozenberg, Julie, Hallegatte, Stéphane, Perrissin-Fabert, Baptiste, and Hourcade,
Jean-Charles (2013), Funding Low-Carbon Investments in the Absence of a
Carbon Tax, Climate Policy 13.1, pp. 134–141, doi: 10 . 1080 / 14693062 .
2012.691222.
Schandl, Heinz, Fischer-Kowalski, Marina, West, James, Giljum, Stefan, Dittrich,
Monika, Eisenmenger, Nina, Geschke, Arne, Lieber, Mirko, Wieland, Hanspeter,
Schaffartzik, Anke, Krausmann, Fridolin, Gierlinger, Sylvia, Hosking, Karin,
Lenzen, Manfred, Tanikawa, Hiroki, Miatto, Alessio, and Fishman, Tomer
(2018), Global Material Flows and Resource Productivity: Forty Years of Ev-
27
idence, Journal of Industrial Ecology 22.4, pp. 827–838, doi: 10.1111/jiec.
12626.
Schröder, Enno and Storm, Servaas (2020), Economic Growth and Carbon Emis-
sions: The Road to “Hothouse Earth” Is Paved with Good Intentions, In-
ternational Journal of Political Economy 49.2, pp. 153–173, doi: 10.1080/
08911916.2020.1778866.
Schwartz, Anna J. (1995), Why Financial Stability Depends on Price Stability,
Economic Affairs 15.4, pp. 21–25, doi: 10 . 1111 / j . 1468 - 0270 . 1995 .
tb00493.x.
Sonnenschein, Hugo (1973), Do Walras’ Identity and Continuity Characterize the
Class of Community Excess Demand Functions?, Journal of Economic Theory
6.4, pp. 345–354.
Théret, Bruno (1999), The Socio-Political Dimensions of the Currency: Implica-
tions for the Transition to the Euro, Journal of Consumer Policy 22.1, pp. 51–
79, doi: 10.1023/A:1006142028937.
Tobin, James (1969), A General Equilibrium Approach To Monetary Theory, Jour-
nal of Money, Credit and Banking 1.1, pp. 15–29, doi: 10.2307/1991374,
JSTOR: 1991374.
Vallet, Cédric (Apr. 19, 2021), Batailles tous azimuts autour de la taxonomie verte
européenne, Alternatives économiques.
Vallet, Guillaume (2019), This is a Man’s world : autorité et pouvoir genrés dans le
milieu des banques centrales, Revue de la régulation. Capitalisme, institutions,
pouvoirs 25, doi: 10.4000/regulation.14738.
Van ‘t Klooster, Jens and Fontan, Clément (2019), The Myth of Market Neutrality:
A Comparative Study of the European Central Bank’s and the Swiss National
Bank’s Corporate Security Purchases, New Political Economy, pp. 1–15, doi:
10.1080/13563467.2019.1657077.
Van ‘t Klooster, Jens and van Tilburg, Rens (2020), Targeting a Sustainable Re-
covery with Green TLTROs, Sustainable Finance Lab, p. 23.
Weber, Pierre-François and Calza, Alessandro (2021), Adapting Central Bank Op-




Institute for Ecological Economics
Welthandelsplatz 2/D5
A-1020  Vienna
+43 (0)1 313 36 4848
ecolecon@wu.ac.at
  
